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This study aims to develop a theory of determining the quality of financial statement reports that can 
increase investor confidence in financial information presented by management. This research 
would like to find the role of good corporate governance in improving the quality of financial 
statements as measured by accounting conservatism and earnings management, then it will be seen 
how the quality ability of financial statement can influence investor confidence level. The result of 
the research did not find the influence of corporate governance mechanism on the quality of 
financial statements. However, the simultaneous test results found that corporate governance 
mechanisms and the quality of financial statements affect the level of investor confidence.          
Profit management as an indicator of the quality of financial statements negatively affects the level 
of investor confidence. But accounting conservatism declared no effect on the level of investor 
confidence. The results of the test with path analysis found that the variables that have a direct 
influence of the mechanism of good corporate governance is the ownership of the institution, while 
other variables have no influence either directly or indirectly. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Investors will favor companies that have a high level of 
profitability. However, high profit information is sometimes 
presented because of the impact of limited management in 
selecting and applying the company's accounting policies. 
Accounting standards as guidelines for presentation of financial 
statements have loopholes that management can use to manage 
earnings in accordance with management interests. So the 
financial statements as a fundamental foundation in making 
financial decisions should be able to provide relevant and 
accurate information in accordance with the needs of users of 
the report. Investors, as one of the parties concerned about the 
company's financial statements, in making investment 
decisions not only require information that is fundamental. 
Qualified financial statements will be the desire of every 
investor, because it will guarantee the level of investor 
confidence in the company's performance. 
 
Research on measuring the quality of financial statements has 
been done a lot, various indicators have been used in measuring 
the quality of financial statements. Chtorou, Bedard, and 
Courteau (2001) have investigated that corporate governance 
practices have an influence on the quality of financial 
information that is publicly announced. Qualified financial 
statements can be fully accounted for by the company's 
management, both on the numbers presented, including the 
recognition and measurement. 
 
In the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) no. 
2 quality information that ensures that information is 
reasonably free from error and bias and honestly presents what 
it is intended to express. The size of the quality of financial 
statements intuitively can be measured by conservatism and 
possible manipulation of financial statements typically 
measured by earnings management. Measuring the quality of 
financial statements with conservatism because conservatism is 
considered an obstacle to producing quality financial 
statements and proxied with non-operating accruals (Watts, 
2003). Earnings management as a tool in measuring the quality 
of financial statements will ensure that the reporting is 
presented not only intended for the interests of a particular 
party but rather put forward on the real conditions that occur. 
 
The company's troubled financial condition can encourage 
managers to manage the level of accounting conservatism. 
Users of financial statements need to understand the possibility 
that changes in accounting profit in addition to being 
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influenced by the performance of managers can also be 
influenced by the accounting conservatism policies pursued by 
managers. Accounting conservatism is based on four issues of 
contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation (watts 2003). 
This will encourage management to use certain techniques to 
present the report, so that between conservatism and earnings 
management detected will inhibit the presentation of quality 
financial statements in accordance with the expectations of all 
interested parties. 
 
This study wanted to examine how corporate governance 
mechanism as a good management measurement can affect the 
quality of financial statements presented by the company to 
gain trust from investors. From the test results will be known 
how the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms to 
investor confidence. Is the quality of financial statements in 
this case accounting conservatism and earnings management is 
an intervening variable for corporate governance mechanisms 
to investor confidence. So it is known whether the mechanism 
of corporate governance has a direct or indirect relationship to 
investor confidence. 
 
The results of this study will generally provide input in the 
development of theory in measuring the level of investor 
confidence, as more theories generated by research will help 
business actors and market participants to find various models 
in improving the quality of financial statements to increase 
investor confidence. Specifically this research will describe the 
determinants of the quality of financial statements from the 
aspect of good corporate management, then the corporate 
governance mechanism is considered as the right measure to be 
able to explain whether or not the management of the company. 
The difference in the results of previous studies of corporate 
governance mechanisms to accounting conservatism and 
earnings management also underlies the idea of this study, so it 
is worthy to be reexamined. The results of Coller and Gregory's 
(1999) study reveal that the more members of the board of 
commissioners in a company, the monitoring function of the 
board of directors can be run better, so that the company will 
avoid fraudulent financial reporting. While Yermack (1996) 
and Jensen (1993) found the number of boards of 
commissioners as one of the corporate governance mechanisms 
negatively affect the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and firm value. 
 
The results of this study is expected to benefit the company to 
be able to measure the extent to which the company's 
management has given confidence to investors, while for 
investors can be a reference in measuring the quality of a 
company for the accuracy of decision making in investing. This 
research also wishes to contribute to the development of 
accounting science and encourage subsequent researchers to 
make further study of good corporate management to ensure 
the quality of financial statements required by investors and 
other interested parties to the company. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Financial statements are declared qualified if current year 
earnings can be a good indicator of future corporate earnings 
(Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993). So the earnings information 
should clearly reveal how the recognition of revenues and costs 
are accurately measured according to the actual conditions. 
Freedom in the selection of accounting policies allows 
management to manage its information for the interests of 
certain parties so that the report becomes conservative and 
tends to take profit management measures to meet the needs 
and expectations of stakeholders. 
 
The concept of conservatism is an act that recognizes costs and 
losses faster, recognizes income and profit more slowly, 
assesses assets with the lowest value, and recognizes the 
obligation with the highest value. Work and Tearney (1997) 
states that conservatism is an attempt to select acceptable 
public accounting methods that will result in the recognition of 
income as slowly as possible, the recognition of expense as 
soon as possible, lower asset valuation and higher liability 
assessment. If accruals are negative, profit is classified as 
conservative, which is due to lower earnings from cash flow 
earned by the company in a given period of Givoly and Hayn 
(2002). 
 
There are three characteristics of conservative accounting 
according to Zhang (2000) which can be seen from the 
disclosure of the average book value is smaller than the market 
value, average earnings less than or equal to economic income 
when long-term growth exceeds or equal to zero and book rate 
of Average return is greater than the discount rate. Similarly 
Ross (2003) states conservatism is the difference in the 
treatment demanded for the recognition of profit or loss, 
accounting conservatism arises from incentives related to 
contract costs, litigation, taxes and politics that benefit the 
company to reduce agency costs and reduce excessive 
payments to parties - parties such as managers, shareholders, 
courts and government. 
 
Company management can be expressed through the 
implementation of good corporate governance. The corporate 
governance mechanism is proxied by the size of the board of 
directors, the size of the board of commissioners, the size of the 
audit committee, the number of independent commissioners, 
directors turnover and institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, labor inspection (Chtourou, 2001; Cornett, 2008; 
Garcia, 2009; Jun). In this study the mechanism used is the 
number of boards of directors, independent board of 
commissioners, audit committee, and institutional ownership. 
 
The agency theory proposed by Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
states that if there is a separation between the owner as the 
principal and the manager as the agent running the company, 
there will be agency problems because each party will always 
try to maximize its utility function. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGHY 
 
The population in this study are companies that list on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange using the data from 2006 to 2013. 
This study uses secondary data obtained from the Indonesian 
Capital Market Directory and Database Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Using path analysis does data analysis technique. 
 
The main output of the results of this study is scientific 
publication; the results of this study will be published in the 
national journal. The additional output generated is the finding 
of model equations for testing various indicators that can 
explain the level of investor confidence in the performance of 
the manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
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From the conceptual framework in figure 1 then the equation 
model formed is as follows: 
 
Equation model: 
 
Y1 =  p1X1+ p2X2 + p3X3+ p4X4+e1     (1) 
 
Y2 =  p5X1+p6 X2+ p7X3+p8 X4+e2     (2) 
 
Y3 = p9X1+ p10X2 + p11X3+ p12X4+p13Y1+p14Y2+e3   (3) 
 
Where: 
P1..14  = Coefficient 
Y1  = Accounting Conservatism 
Y2  = Earning Management 
Y3  = Investor Confidence Level 
X1  = Board of Directors Size 
X2  = Size of Board of Commissioners 
X3  = Number of Audit Committee 
X4  = Institutional Ownership 
E1,2,3  = Error Term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Accounting Conservatism 
 
This research failed to find any significant influence between 
corporate governance mechanism and the quality of financial 
statements. Accounting conservatism and earnings 
management are simultaneously and partially unaffected by 
boards of directors, commissioners, audit committees, 
institutional ownership. This finding does not support the 
findings of Chtorou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001) who have 
investigated that corporate governance practices have an 
influence on the quality of financial information. 
 
The board of directors has no effect on conservatism. However, 
a positive sign can mean that the size or number of the board of 
commissioners is expected to reduce the conflict of interest 
between stakeholders and increase investor confidence. The 
magnitude of the board of commissioners can be viewed as a 
means to provide input and control the opportunistic behavior 
of directors and management the board of commissioners has 
no effect on conservatism. These results do not support the 
findings of Coller and Gregory (1999), which reveal that the 
more the number of members of the board of commissioners 
within a company, the monitoring function of the board of 
directors can be run better, so that companies will avoid 
fraudulent financial reporting. While Yermack (1996) and 
Jensen (1993) found the number of boards of commissioners as 
one of the corporate governance mechanisms negatively affect 
the relationship between accounting conservatism and firm 
value. When viewed from a negative sign on the beta 
coefficient, this result agrees to state that an increasingly high 
number of boards of commissioners are unlikely to reduce the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework 
 
Table 1 Operational Definition of Variables 
 
No Variabele Defenition Indicator 
1. X1 = Board of Directors Size 
The number of members of the board of directors as the party 
responsible for the management of the company management Number of boards of directors 
 
2. 
 
 
X2 = Size of Board of 
Commissioners 
The number of members of the board of commissioners as 
responsible party and authorized to oversee management 
actions, and provide advice to management if deemed necessar 
 
Number of boards of commissioners 
 
3. 
 
X3 = Number of Audit 
Committee 
The number of audit committee members consisting of 
individuals who are independent and not involved with the task. 
Day-to-day management of the managing company, and who 
have experience to carry out the monitoring function effectively. 
 
Number of audit committee members 
4. X4 = Institutional Ownership 
Number of share ownership by institutional investors to total 
number of shares outstanding 
Percentage of total shares owned by the institution of total 
shares outstanding 
5. 
Y1 = Accounting 
Conservatism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conservatism is an attempt to choose acceptable general 
accounting methods that will result in the recognition of income 
as slowly as possible, the recognition of expenses as quickly as 
possible, lower asset valuations and higher liability assessment 
Non-operating accruals = TACC (before depreciation) - 
OACC. 
Where: 
1. TACC = (net income + depreciation) - Cash flow from 
operational. 
2. OACC = Δ Account Receivable + Δ Inventories + Δ 
prepaid expense - Δ Account Payable - Δ Accrued expense 
- Δ tax payable. (Watts, 2003) 
6. 
 
Y2 = Earning 
Management 
Earnings management is an action performed by management to 
report the company's earnings in accordance with the 
information required at the time of reporting 
Using Modified Jones Model ie Discretionary accrual (Dechow 
et al, 1995) 
DAit = TAit / Ait-1 - NDAit 
7. 
Y3 = Investor 
Confidence Level 
 
Behavior of investment decision making that is, the decision of 
investor to sell, buy, or hold hold of owned securities can 
influence market 
Using Abnormal Return: 
ARit = Rit -E [R] it 
Information: 
ARit: the abnormal return of the i-th security at the period of 
the t-event. 
Rit: the actual return occurring for the i-th security at the 
period of the tth event. 
E [Rit]: the expected return of the i-th security for the period of 
the t-event. 
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use of conservative accounting principles. In addition, the audit 
committee has no effect on conservatism and Institutional 
ownership has no effect on accounting conservatism, with a 
negative beta coefficient. 
 
Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanism on Profit 
Management 
 
The test results found that the corporate governance mechanism 
has no effect on earnings management. Judging from the beta 
coefficients that indicate a positive sign is only the board of 
directors, meaning that if the size of the board of directors the 
greater the company will tend to take profit management 
action. The negative sign on the board of commissioners, audit 
committee and institutional ownership means that the greater 
the number of boards of commissioners, audit committee, 
institutional ownership will reduce the happening of earnings 
management in the company. 
 
The findings of this study rejected the research hypothesis, 
failed to find the effect of corporate governance on earnings 
management. In line with Dechow et al (1996), which also 
found that the number of boards of directors has no effect on 
earnings management. This means that the change in the size of 
the board of directors, will not affect corporate earnings 
management actions. 
 
Testing the influence of board of commissioner to earnings 
management reject the research hypothesis, Similarly, the 
board of commissioners declared no effect on earnings 
management. The examination of the effect of institutional 
ownership on earnings management is also unsuccessful. Thus 
rejecting the findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Morkck et al (1982) which found a negative influence of 
institutional ownership of earnings management. 
 
Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanism, Accounting 
Conservatism and Profit Management to Investor Trust 
 
Investor confidence in a company is influenced by various 
factors, such as management of quality, company ability in 
producing high financial performance in accordance with 
stakeholder expectations, and presentation of quality financial 
reports. In this study, the quality of financial statements proxies 
with accounting conservatism and earnings management is 
expected to affect investor confidence in investment decision-
making. The level of investor confidence is also suspected to 
be affected by GCG mechanisms measured using board of 
directors, board of commissioners, audit committees, 
institutional ownership. 
 
The test results found that simultaneously corporate 
governance mechanisms and the quality of financial statements 
affect the level of investor confidence. Investor confidence is 
measured by using investment decision-making behavior, i.e., 
the decision of an investor to sell, buy, or hold of any securities 
owned may affect the market. But what has a partial effect on 
investor confidence is institutional ownership and earnings 
management. Negative coupled coefficient beta means that 
greater institutional ownership will increase investor 
confidence. While earnings management is said to have a 
negative effect on investor confidence, meaning if the lower 
earnings management actions will increase investor confidence. 
Thus the hypothesis of this study is acceptable. 
Although this research fails to find the effect of accounting 
conservatism on investor confidence, it does not mean that 
conservatism has no impact on the presentation of financial 
statements. The financial statements should be supplemented 
by voluntary disclosure of valuable off-balance-sheet 
information for investors. Such information such as research 
and development, human resources, information technology, 
corporate strategy and so forth. Otherwise the information 
users will assume the information presented in the financial 
statements to be meaningless. The rise of conservatism shows 
the failure of conventional accounting in presenting accounting 
numbers that have high value relevance. Quality accounting 
information is useful for investors to decrease asymmetric 
information and increase company value. 
 
Furthermore, this study also wanted to find out how the role of 
corporate governance mechanism and the quality of financial 
statements as intermediary variables are proxies by accounting 
conservatism and earnings management to the level of investor 
confidence. When viewed from table 4 the comparison 
showing the beta value in each equation is done to see how the 
relationship of each variable of corporate governance 
mechanism namely the board of directors (X1), commissioner 
(X2), audit committee (X3), institutional ownership (X4) To 
investor confidence (Y3), whether it has a direct relationship or 
make the quality of financial statements as measured by 
accounting conservatism (Y1) and earnings management (Y2) 
as intervening variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The summary shown in table 2 can be seen that the size of the 
board of commissioners and audit committee has an indirect 
relationship to investor confidence. This means that the quality 
of financial statements with accounting conservatism and 
earnings management indicators is a variable that mediates the 
board of commissioners and audit committees in influencing 
investor confidence. The negative sign found in the coefficient 
indicates that if accounting conservatism and earnings 
management is lower then investor confidence will increase. 
 
The size of the board of directors and institutional ownership 
has a direct relationship with the level of investor confidence. 
The greater the size of the board of directors will be able to 
increase investor confidence. Similarly with institutional 
ownership, if the portion of institutional ownership is greater 
then it will increase investor confidence to the company. But 
the effect test results are not able to prove the direct influence 
of the board of directors on the level of investor confidence. 
Because the test results state that there is no influence between 
the board of directors and the level of investor confidence. 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms that have a direct and 
positive effect on investor confidence are only institutional 
ownership. The quality of financial statements proxies with 
Table 2 Relationship between Variables 
 
No. Indirect Relationship Result 
Direct 
Relationship Result Conclusion 
1. X1-Y1-Y3 0.008299 X1 – Y3 0.236 Direct 
2. X2-Y1-Y3 -0.010320 X2 – Y3 -0.237 Indirect 
3. X3-Y1-Y3 0.000258 X3 – Y3 -0.003 Indirect 
4. X4-Y1-Y3 -0.006750 X4 – Y3 0.202 Direct 
5. X1-Y2-Y3 -0.045050 X1 – Y3 0.236 Direct 
6. X2-Y2-Y3 0.003927 X2 – Y3 -0.237 Indirect 
7. X3-Y2-Y3 0.002079 X3 – Y3 -0.003 Indirect 
8. X4-Y2-Y3 0.028413 X4 – Y3 0.202 Direct 
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accounting conservatism and earnings management suspected 
as an intermediary variable for constitutional ownership is not 
proven. Because the results show that constitutional ownership 
can directly affect the level of investor confidence. This means 
that this study proves that greater institutional ownership will 
increase investor confidence. 
 
CONLUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
The corporate governance mechanisms measured by using 
boards of directors, audit committees, independent 
commissioners and institutional ownership have no effect on 
the quality of financial statements. The quality of financial 
statements as measured by accounting conservatism as well as 
earnings management, based on signification testing 
simultaneously and partially rejects the proposed research 
hypothesis. This means that this study does not find the role of 
corporate governance mechanism in determining the quality of 
financial statements. The simultaneous testing of the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms and the quality of financial 
statements on the level of trust accepts the research hypothesis. 
That the mechanism of corporate governance and the quality of 
financial statements affect the level of investor confidence. 
Partial test results found that the variables that have influence 
are institutional ownership and earnings management. While 
other variables such as boards of directors, audit committee, 
board of commissioners and accounting conservatism do not 
affect the level of investor confidence. Institutional ownership 
has a direct relationship to the level of investor confidence, 
without any intermediary variable of the quality of financial 
statements, accounting conservatism or earnings management. 
The greater institutional ownership will increase investor 
confidence in the company. Profit management actions 
undertaken by the firm will lower the level of investor 
confidence. This is evidenced by the negative coefficients on 
the test results. This means that this study successfully proves 
that earnings management has a negative effect on the level of 
investor confidence. The lower the profit management action 
will increase investor confidence. The amount of sample data is 
limited to 96 firms over a period of 4 years of observation, and 
limited to manufacturing firms, thus failing to prove the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms for improving the quality of 
financial statements that may affect investor confidence in the 
firm. Limitations in the selection of research variables may also 
be the reasons for rejection in some research hypotheses. 
Because the corporate governance mechanism uses only four 
measurement indicators and ignores other elements so the 
ability to explain the relation of the variables under study is 
very low, as evidenced by the R square value of less than 15% 
of the three equations used. This suggests that other variables 
not used in this study may be more dominant to explain or will 
affect the dependent variable. 
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